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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

VERXE'f.1\. CORNIA,
Plaintiff-Appellant~

Case No.
10062

vs.
~\LBERTSON'S,

a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF

RESPONDEN1~

ST.A.TE:\IEXT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff brought this action against the defendant
claiming injuries as the result of an alleged fall in one
of the defendant's markets in Salt Lake City. Plaintiff clain1ed that the fall was caused by an unknown
slippery substance on the floor.

.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The issues of fact were submitted to the jury in
the form of a special verdict. The answers given by the
jury found that the defendant was not negligent in
any manner. Based upon the jury's answers, the court
directed that judgment on the verdict be entered in
favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, no
cause of action on her complaint. Thereafter, plaintiff
filed a Motion for a New Trial and argued the same
before the trial court, Honorable A. H. Ellett presiding, who denied plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff thereafter
filed this appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent seeks affirmance of the
judgment based upon the jury's verdict rendered in
the court below.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant bases her appeal exclusively upon the
conduct of the court after the case was submitted to the
jury. (Appellant's Brief, Page 2). The jury found
the issues of fact in favor of the respondent. The appellant does not take exception to the jury's findings and,
therefore, all issues of fact and reasonable inferences
arising therefrom will be viewed in a light most favor4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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able to the respondent. Tomner's Estate vs. Union
Paeifir Hail Company, 1~1 Ut. 37, 239 P. 2nd 163.
Uespondent will limits its statement of facts to
those conuuencing frmn the time the jury was returned
to the eourtroom immediately prior to its taking a
rcl·ess for dinner. There is no useful purpose to be
served in 1naking a lengthy recitation of the facts surrounding the issues of liability since the jury's findings
as to liability are not under attack. (Appellant's Brief,
Page ~). There appears an obvious effort on the part
of the appellant to invoke the sympathy of this court
hy setting out testimony of witnesses on issues not
raised on appeal. (Appellant's Brief, Pages 2 to 7,
:.?2 and :?a).
\Yhile the jury was deliberating, the court advised
counsel that he was going to have the jury returned to
the courtroom to see if they desired to go to dinner.
The jury returned to the courtroom at 6:31 P.M. The
court then stated :
"The Court: Officers of court, Lady and
gentlemen, and the parties here are getting hungry. and we were wondering whether we would
haYe time to eat and what the status of your
matter and appetite is. I told you you would be
your own boss, and you are, but we kind of could
work our program in with yours if we knew how
you were standing. HaYe you answered some of
the questions?"
"~IR.

0 . .\K.ASOX: Yes, sir, we have." (R.

249).

5
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The court then went on to ask the foreman of the
jury, Mr. Oakason, to pass the questions to the sheriff
so that the court could see the answers that they had
made .The foreman informed the court that although
some of the questions had been answered, there were
no signatures to the verdict. The court then informed
the foreman that the signatures would not be necessary
but he would like to look at the answers they had put
on the questions submitted to them. The answers were
then viewed by the court. At this point the foreman of
the jury was attempting to inform the court how the
jury stood but was not allowed to do so by direct order
of the court. The foreman stated:
"MR. OAKASON: Can I tell you what ... "
"THE COURT: No, don't tell me yet. I
don't want these fellows to know. I am leaguing
up with you, but if you can do it in that-can
you do it in the jury box?"
"MR. OAKASON: Sure, we are down to one
question."
"THE COURT: Okey. You do what you can,
and then let me take a look at it." (R. 250).
The verdict was then returned to the fore man of the
jury, who filled in the answers to the questions that the
jury had already decided. The verdict was then returned
to the court. After looking at the verdict a second
time the court inquired of the foreman as follows:
"Now, for the two answers that are here,
would more than six jurors sign that?"
"MR. OAKASON: Six, yes, sir, or more."

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.. TilE CO { 'H'f: \Yell, let's have six sign
that, and then I believe I will have some help
for you .. \nd if six or Inore have signed each one,
would you sign at the end thereof as foreman
too, :\1 r. Oakason." (R. :!50).
The verdict was then returned to the foreman of the
jury, who circulated the verdict among the jurors for
the signatures and then returned the same to the court.
1\t this point the court viewed the verdict and stated
as follows:
"THE COURT: The answers are as follows, and I will let counsel know and ask you
to show by the raising of your hand if you have
agreed with this answer ... " (R. 250).
The court then went on to read the first two questions
and answers, and in doing so polled the jury by a show•
ing of hands as to whether or not the answers of the
persons signing the verdict, of which they all agreed.
(R. :!50 and :!51). \Yhen the court reached Question
X umber 3 and before reading the question the court
said:
"Question-There are only five that signed
Question Number 3. Is there somebody else that
signed-five can't find that. Is there somebody
who didn't sign Number 3?"
"~IR. l"'"NDER\VOOD: That is the one we
are held up on."

··~IR.

LE\VIS: That is the one we are held

upon."
''THE COURT: I see. So we have no answer
to 3."
7
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"MR. OAKASON: That's right."
"THE COURT: Oh. Well, I can't help you.
If the answer-if 3 had been answered, I could
have saved a little time. So there really isn't an
answer to 3 yet. So my-I was going by the
answer, assuming that six had agreed. I was in
error about that, and I would have to let you
debate further on 3. Now that I have broken into
your affairs, do you want to do to dinner?" (R.
251}.

The court then went on to inquire of the jury as to
whether or not they desired to go to dinner or have
dinner sent in. While the matter of going to dinner was
being discussed a juror inquired of the court concerning
further evidence. Mr. Pearce stated as follows:
"MR. PEARCE: Your Honor, I have one
question. Is there any part of this that we could
ask a question of you that might help us in our
decision of this?"
"THE COURT: Well, I can talk to you
about the law. You are the sole judges of the
fact. If the law isn't clear, I could rewrite it or
maybe explain it. What did you have in mind?"
(R. 252 and 253).
Then after further discussion, juror Pearce said:
"MR. PEARCE: My question is, your Honor,
and the thing that's been in my mind that I am
concerned about deeply is they were mopping the
floor admittedly, but were they spot mopping
this, or was this a general mop?"
"THE COURT: Well, now, this is a question
that the jurors themselves are going to have to

8
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detern1ine. I 'rn not permitted to comment on the
eYidentT or tell you at all. You have to deterrnine for yourselves from the evidence what it
was. and no one can tell you what the fact is.
Of course, if you don't follow the evidence, it
would be my duty to give a new trial in the matter, so you are not permitted just to make up
things. You haYe to follow the evidence as given.
If there should be any question in your mind,
a dispute that you can't settle amongst yourselves on a factual situation, I suppose the re·
porter might be able to help you by reading testimony to you."
--~IH.PEARCE:

This would be helpful. I

would like it.''
--~IH.

LE\VIS: I think that--"

"THE COURT: Might solve your question?"
··~IR.

PEARCE: I think it will."

"THE COURT: Well, what witness did you
want to know about?"
--~IR. PEARCE: This would-this would
have reference I think to the boy that was doing
the mopping, Coburn."

"THE COURT: That would be-would it
be Coburn, Timothy Donald Coburn?"
"~IR.

PEARCE: Yes."

"THE COl}RT: )!iss Parker, can you find
his testimony? 1_~ ou still will understand that you
are the sole judges of the evidence and the fact
that :\Iiss Parker is reading to you what she
took down is just to be of help to you. Still it is
for you to decide what the evidence is and was."

9
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"MR. PEARCE:
sir."

Yes, I understand this,

"THE COURT: All right. Before you read
it, let me say something else. The fact that we
are reading this, one man's testimony, isn't to be
understood as giving any extra emphasis to his
testimony."
"MR. PEARCE: Yes, sir."
"THE COURT: That if there is any doubt
about what some other witness said, you may
have that read too."
"MR. PEARCE: Okey."
"THE COURT: All right." (R. 253 and
254).

The reporter then commenced to read the testimony
of the witness as requested by the juror. (R. 254 to
258) . After a considerable portion of the direct testimony of the witness had been read the juror requesting
this testimony said:
"MR. PEARCE: I have heard enough."
"THE COURT: Does anyone want to hear
more?" (R. 258).
No one requested any further reading of the testimony of this witness, and plaintiff's counsel made no
request or voiced any comment in respect to the reading
of such testimony. (R. 258). The court then again discussed with the jurors their desires about going to
dinner. It was decided that the jury would retire to
a restaurant to have something to eat before further
10
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deliberating on the case. Prior to leaving the courtroom
juror Jlca r<'c stated:
··Your Honor, why dont' you give us ten minutcs and see how we are coming, and then we

will go eat."
''THE COURT: All right. Do you want a
recess-yes.''
"~lit CORNELIUS: Your Honor, in that
question number three, it seems to me that the
crux of it is a matter of time."

"THE COURT: That's right." (R. 258}.
The court then went on to briefly discuss the question
of going to dinner and it was then indicated by some
of the jurors that they did not want to further deliberate
as suggested by juror Pearce. At this point witness
Lewis stated that in fairness to both parties they should
not decide the issue by rushing and they should take
their time and go to dinner.
"~IH.

LE,VIS: I think dinner is the answer."

"THE COURT: Generally it is." (R. 261).
After the jurors returned from dinner, they resumed deliberations, and at 10:17 P.M. the jurors
returned to the courtroom stating to the court that they
had answered all but the last question. The court examined the questions and answers affixed thereto and
announced the findings and directed that a judgment
be entered in favor of the defendant based upon the
jury's verdict. (R. 265 to 268).
11
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POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMANCE
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INQUIRING OF THE JURY AS TO THE STATUS OF
THEIR DELIBERATIONS, NOR DID TI-IE
COURT REQUIRE THE JURY TO DELIBERATE IN OPEN COURT.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
GRANTING THE REQUEST OF A JUROR
TO HEAR TESTIMONY OF ONE OF THE
WITNESSES.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL OR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INQUIRING OF THE JURY AS TO THE STATUS OF
THEIR DELIBERATIONS, NOR DID THE
COURT REQUIRE THE JURY TO DELIBERATE IN OPEN COURT.

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The record clearly reflects that the court, prior to
the dinner recess, asked the foreman of the jury whether
or not they desired to go to dinner and incidental thereto, whether or not they had made any progress in their
deliberations. ( R. 249). At no time did the court request
that the foreman divulge the numerical division of the
jurors voting on any particular question until the foreman indicated to the court that six or more of the
jurors had approved of the answers to all but one of
the questions. In fact, the court interrupted the foreman
of the jury and admonished him not to reveal the division of the jury on the answers given at that time. (R.
:!50). The court was told in its discussion with the foreman of the jury, that six or more of the jurors had concurred in the answers that were made to the interrogatories. Upon privately reading the answers to the
questions submitted to the jury, 'it was apparent to the
court that the jurors had found that the defendant
was not negligent and therefore not liable to the plaintiff. In the interest of time, the court then handed the
interrogatories back to the foreman of the jury for
signatures.

i\. ppellant, in her brief, infers that the court inquired of the jury as to the numerical division prior to
being told that they had answered all but one question
and that the court was making unnecessary inquiries
that were coercive. The record clearly shows that such
inquiry was made only after the court had been told
that the jury had answered all but one of the questions.
(R. 250).

13
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In the case of Railway Express Agency vs.
Mackay, 181 Federal 2nd 257, 19 ALR 2nd 1248, the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
discussed the question of the court's authority to ascertain if the jury is making any progress in their deliberations. In its opinion, the court quotes from the case of
Allis vs. United States, 155 U.S. 117, 15 Supreme
Court 36, 39 Lawyers Edition 91, wherein the Supreme
Court of the United States said:
"It is a familiar practice to recall a jury, after
they have been in deliberation for any length
of time, for the purpose of ascertaining what
difficulties they have in the consideration of the
case, and of making proper efforts to assist them
in the solution of those difficulties. It would be
startling to have such action held to be error,
and error sufficient to reverse a judgment."
This view is also supported by other authorities.
See 53 American Jurisprudence, Page 651, Section
904, wherein the author states:
"It is not error, however, for a trial judge to
communicate with a jury after they have been
in deliberation for any length of time, for the
purpose of ascertaining whether they have
agreed, or as to the reason for their disagreemept."
Counsel for appellant has cited two Federal cases
wherein the courts disapproved of the practice of the
trial judge asking the jury as to the numerical division
of the jury prior to its arriving at a decision. It should
be noted that the cases cited by the appellant are crimi-
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nal cases requiring a unanimous verdict. Obviously, no
useful purpose could be served in asking the jury, prior
to a decision, what number stood for conviction and
what jurors were for acquittal. In these cases, a unanimous verdict is required and no useful purpose is served
in inquiring about the numerical division. In a civil
case requiring less than a unanimous verdict, the court,
of necessity, must inquire of the jury whether or not at
least three-fourths of the jurors have arrived at a verdict. Otherwise, the court could not be of assistance
to the jury when assistance was needed. In any event,
in the instant case, the court did not make any inquiry
of the jurors until the foreman represented to the court
that at least six or more of the jurors had agreed to
the answers placed on the questions. (R. 249-250).
It should be observed that no deliberations of any
nature occurred while the jurors were present in the
courtroom. The record is absolutely silent as to any
deliberations but reflects only the fact that the answers
to the questions were signed by the jurors while in the
courtroom. Rules 47 ( q) and ( r) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that if a verdict is informal
or insufficient it may be corrected by the jury under
the advice of the court or the jury may be sent out
again. In the instant case, the foreman of the jury told
the court they had arrived at answers to all but one
question but had not signed the verdict.
On page 18 of appellant's brief, opposite counsel
claims that the jurors indicated a coercive impact by
15
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stating that they did not wish to rush their deliberations.
The court did not attempt to rush the deliberations of
the jury but in fact, to the contrary, advised the1n that
perhaps going to dinner would give them more chance
to consider the matter and to resolve their problems.
The trial court said:
"THE COURT: Well, we can do a little
better than that. I suppose we can have the
chicken-Harman's to send over chicken dinners
with coffee if you wanted it. If coffee would
serve, it would take about as much trouble to get
the coffee as the whole dinner. It wouldn}t take
you much longer to go eat} and it might do you
good if you are having problems.}} (R. 251).
(Emphasis ours) .
The court then attempted to encourage the jurors to
take all the time they needed by further saying:
"THE COURT: If you got out and aired
and forgot about your problem, maybe when you
came back you would have a little different attitude. What do yo uthink about that? Would
that be wise?" (R. 252).
After the foregoing conversation took place the
juror, Pearce, requested the court to read the testimony
of witness Coburn. It was after the testimony of witness
Coburn that Pearce wanted to speed up the deliberations by suggested that a ten-minute period of deliberations might be sufficient to resolve the matter still
pending. (R. 258). In response to the suggestion of
Mr. Pearce, it was then that juror Lewis stated that
there was no need to rush the deliberations and that
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he thought il was a good idea if they go to dinner. To
this juror T.cw is replied:
··1 think dinner is the answer."

The eourt responded by saying:
"Generally it is." (R. 261).
The appellant, at page 19 of her brief, infers that
settlement negotiations were being conducted by the
pnrties while the jury was deliberating. The affidavit
of counsel for the respondent completely refutes the
allegations made by the appellant in this regard. (R.
71). Opposite counsel intends to mislead this court by
such assertion for the reason that no offer of settlement
was ever made by respondent's counsel during the
course of the trial. In any event, such are not matters
of record and have no place in a brief on appeal.
.A.ppellant cites the case of State vs. ~:lartinez,
i Ut. 2nd 387, 326 P. 2nd 102, in support of her case .
.. \ review of the facts and law of the Martinez case
indicates that it was a case concerning the propriety of
permiting jurors to cross examine witnesses. The case
is not in point with the instant case and need not be
further discussed.
POINT II
TIIE TRLAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
GRAXTIXG THE REQLTEST OF A JUROR
TO HE . .-\R TESTI)IOXY OF ONE OF THE
\YITXESSES.

17
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On page 20 of the appellant's brief, opposite counsel infers that the court directed the reporter to read
only a portion of the testimony of one of the witnesses.
This is not an accurate statement of the record as is
clearly shown by the request of the court that the testimony be read. (R. 254). It was only after the juror
indicated to the court that no further testimony was
desired that the reporter discontinued reading her
notes. The court then inquired:
"Does anyone want to hear more?" (R. 258) .
Counsel for appellant made no request in connection
with such testimony, and made no comment whatsoever
in respect to the matter. (R. 258).
Appellant cites the case of Jenkins vs. Stevens, 64
Ut. 307, 231 P. 112, stating that it is improper and
reversible error to allow the reading of a witness's
testimony while the jury is deliberating. The facts in
the Jenkins case show that the testimony was read to
the jury without first notifying counsel for the parties,
which was contrary to the statute. In the instant case,
counsel for both parties were present in the courtroom
when the request was made. Rule 47 (n) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the furnishing of the jury with the testimony of any of the
witnesses where there is a disagreement. This court
approved the reading of a witness's testimony by its
opinion in the case of State vs. Hines, 6 Ut. 2nd 126,
307 P. 2nd 887, wherein this honorable court said:

18
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·· ::\ o authority is cited, and we are acquainted
with none, which holds that the granting of such
n request is error. On the contrary, the wellrecognized general rule is that it is within the
trial court's diserdion to grant the jury's request
to reread parts of the testimony."
See also an annotation on the subject at 50 ALR 2nd

176, wherein the author states:

" . . . in most instances the same general rules
as to the right to have the reporter's notes read
to the jury apply to criminal and civil cases
alike. Thus, the vas! majority of the cases, both
<.Timinal and civil, adhere to the view that it is
proper to read such notes to the jury ... "
Thereafter, appellant further argues Point II of
her brief with testimony of witnesses concerning facts
about the alleged injury. It is respectfully submitted
that such testimony is immaterial and has no bearing
in the 1natter as the jury found the issues of fact in
favor of the respondent and the appellant has not taken
exception in her brief to those findings.

POINT III
THE COlTRT DID XOT ERR IN DENYIXG APPELLANT'S l\IOTION FOR A MISTRIAL OR IX DEXYIXG APPELLANT'S
Sl"BSEQlTEXT ~IOTIOX FOR A NEW

TRIAL.
19
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For the reasons set forth in the arguments of Points
I and II, the trial court was correct in denying appellant's motions and the same will not be further argued
by the respondent. Suffice it to say, appellant was not
deprived of a fair trial. There was no error committed
by the learned trial judge as will appear from the record
heretofore cited.

CONCLUSION
The jury found the issue of fact in favor of the
respondent. Those findings are not in question on appeal. If the appellant slipped in the respondent's store
as she alleged, such was not caused through any negligent act or omission of the respondent, and the jury
so found. There was ample evidence in the record to
show that appellant suffered no injury on the premises
of respondent as she told her physician that she fell
at work and injured her back. (R. 140 to 143, Exhibit
23, p. 4) . The trial court did not err in inquiring as to
the progress of the jury's deliberations or in permitting
the reporter's notes of the testimony of one witness to
be read to the jury at their request so as to assist them
in their deliberations.
In the case of Charlton vs. Hackett, 11 Ut. 2nd
389, 360 P. 2nd 176, this honorable court stated:
"In considering the attack on the findings and
judgment of the trial court it is our duty to
follow these cardinal rules of review: To indulge
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then1 a preslllnption of validity and correctness;
to re<plirc the appellant to sustain the burden
of showing error; to review the record in the
light most favorable to them; and not to disturb
the1n if they find substantial support in the evidence."
\ \' e subn1it that no error was committed and the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
F. Robert Bayle and
\Yallace R. Lauchnor
of
BAYLE, HURD & LAUCHNOR
1105 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent-Defendant
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